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Kripke [Kp] formulates the following puzzle.
At any moment of time, Kripke might be thinking of a certain set
of times.
For example, the set of all times when TV was unknown. Or the
set of all times when interplanetary travel will be commonplace
and the like.

Kripke proceeds.
However, there is a problem: suppose I think at a certain
time t0 of the set S0 where S0 contains all times t at
which I’m thinking of a given set St of times, and St
does not include t itself. In conventional notation:
S0 = {t|St exists & t 6∈ St }
Now, I am thinking of S0 at a certain time t0 . Is t0 a
member of S0 or not? The reader can fill in the resulting
paradox for herself.

One question which might be raised here is What does thinking of
something amount to? It is not clear to me what Kripke’s notion
of ‘thinking of something’ is. I have used an approach where
syntax is an intermediary to semantics which is then used to think
of things.

Thus I shall take the point of view that thinking of some X is
mentally repeating some words intended to denote X . If there is
such an X , and is denoted by the expression one has mentally
repeated then in normal circumstances one has succeeded in
thinking of X .

However, surely that is not the only way. Perhaps one thinks of
someone by having a picture of him in one’s mind. So I might
think of Quine, not by saying the word to myself but remembering
him. But remembering how? In his office? Giving a lecture at
CUNY? If I remember him giving a lecture and someone else
remembers him walking through Harvard yard, then are we
thinking of different persons? If I read Borges’ The Aleph in
English and Adriana reads it in Spanish then when we think about
The Aleph are we thinking of the same book?

I shall avoid such questions by simply assuming that thinking of
Quine amounts to saying the word to oneself provided one satisfies
the required conditions viz: one has met Quine or read one of his
papers or met someone who knew Quine, or whatever. A second
reason for going the linguistic route is that while at least a weak
case can be made that one can think of Quine by having a mental
image of him, it seems implausible that one can think of S0
without going the linguistic route. [Sm] discusses some of these
questions though in a different context.

Before addressing Kripke’s problem, let us turn to another Harvard
philosopher, namely Hilary Putnam who is famous for not being
able to distinguish a beech from an elm. Suppose that Putnam is
looking at a tree in a friend’s backyard and says, “I think that tree
might be a beech.”
The friend responds, “Do you mean to say that my tree is a
member of the set of all beech trees?”, and Putnam responds,
“Yes, just that. I think your tree is a member of the set of beech
trees.”

Now Putnam does not know whether the tree in question is a
beech or not. May we nonetheless say that Putnam is thinking of
the set B of beech trees and wondering if the tree in question
belongs to B?
Surely yes. Putnam does not need to be able to tell a beech tree
by sight in order to think of the set B, just as we can think of
Aristotle without having the ability to recognize him by sight.

Here is the quote from Putnam: Suppose you are like me and
cannot tell an elm from a beech tree. We still say that the
extension of ’elm’ in my idiolect is the same as the extension of
’elm’ in anyone else’s, viz., the set of all elm trees, and that the set
of all beech trees is the extension of ’beech’ in both of our
idiolects. Thus ’elm’ in my idiolect has a different extension from
’beech’ in your idiolect (as it should). Is it really credible that this
difference in extension is brought about by some difference in our
concepts? My concept of an elm tree is exactly the same as my
concept of a beech tree (I blush to confess).

And again, The last two examples depend upon a fact about
language that seems, surprisingly, never to have been pointed out:
that there is division of linguistic labor. We could hardly use such
words as ’elm and ’aluminum’ if no one possessed a way of
recognizing elm trees and aluminum metal; but not everyone to
whom the distinction is important has to be able to make the
distinction.

Let us shift the example; consider gold. Gold is important for
many reasons: it is a precious metal; it is a monetary metal; it has
symbolic value (it is important to most people that the ”gold”
wedding ring they wear really consist of gold and not just look
gold); etc. Consider our community as a ”factory”: in this
”factory” some people have the ”job” of wearing gold wedding
rings; other people have the ”job” of selling gold wedding rings;
still other people have the job of telling whether or not something
is really gold.

It is not at all necessary or efficient that every one who wears a
gold ring (or a gold cufflink, etc.), or discusses the ”gold
standard,” etc., engage in buying and selling gold. Nor is it
necessary or efficient that every one who buys and sells gold be
able to tell whether or not something is really gold in a society
where this form of dishonesty is uncommon (selling fake gold) and
in which one can easily consult an expert in case of doubt. And it
is certainly not necessary or efficient that every one who has
occasion to buy or wear gold be able to tell with any reliability
whether or not something is really gold.

The foregoing facts are just examples of mundane division of labor
(in a wide sense). But they engender a division of linguistic labor:
every one to whom gold is important for any reason has to acquire
the word ’gold’; but he does not have to acquire the method of
recognizing whether something is or is not gold. Thus a chain
extending from us to Aristotle enables us to think of him, (see
[Kn]), and the community of horticulturists enables Putnam to
think of the set B. He can just say the word “beech” or think it,
and he thinks of B.

The work of deciding on the denotation of the word “beech” is
done by society and it is society which helps Putnam “think of”
the set of beech trees by just using the word “beech”. There is a
linguistic division of labor. Putnam thinks the word “beech” and
the community sees to it that he is thinking of the set of beeches.

For another example, I can speak about (and think of) the set of
physicists currently at CERN without knowing whether my friend
Pran Nath is currently at CERN or not. If he is, then he is a
member of the set I am thinking about and if not then not. I do
not need a mental image of all the physicists lined up in a row, nor
do I need to know whether Pran is at Cern. The community does
part of the work for me by deciding who is to be counted as a
physicist and Pran does part of the work by being at CERN or by
not being at CERN. All I need is the phrase “the set of physicists
currently at CERN.

In Putnam’s case, Putnam does not play any role in deciding what
a beech tree is and in my case I do not play a role in deciding what
the word “physicist” means or who is at CERN. And it is Putnam’s
non-interference with the meaning of “beech” and my
non-interference (as we shall see) with physicisthood that enables
us to use the word or the phrase to think of something.

Before returning to Kripke’s puzzle, let us consider another,
practical problem. Mr. Smith wants to listen to a lecture by
Kripke, but it turns out that the room in which Kripke is speaking
is full. However, CUNY has considerately provided rooms A and B
in which a video transmission of the lecture can be heard. Smith
goes into room A and starts listening when he suddenly realizes
that there a problem. It is Thursday evening, and Smith belongs to
a religion which allows him to listen to a lecture on a Thursday
only if the room in which he is doing the listening has an odd
number of people in it (including Smith himself). Unfortunately
(and Smith counts) there are 20 people in room A including Smith.
Clearly Smith cannot stay in room A.

But then he looks across the hall and sees that room B only has 11
people in it. ‘Aha!” says Smith and proceeds to room B. He sits
down and starts to listen. But after a minute or two his conscience
starts to trouble him and he counts the number of people in room
B. The number, alas, is 12. Clearly Smith cannot stay in B and
proceeds back to A which, he can now see, only has 19 people. We
need not trouble ourselves more with Smith’s quandary. Perhaps
he just goes home. Or perhaps he pays someone in A to move to
room B.

Smith’s problem is a convoluted version of a simpler problem. Can
I enter an empty elevator? Yes, if all I ask is that the elevator be
empty prior to my entering it. But if I demand that the elevator be
empty after I have entered it, then I am going to be frustrated.

For an even more alarming example, if a man cannot marry a
married woman, and he cannot marry an unmarried woman, then
marriage would come to an end. It is clever of mankind to decide
that “an unmarried woman” means a woman who is unmarried
before she says “I do”.

We do have occasion to worry that we are not able to enter a full
elevator, especially if we are late for class. But not many of us
worry about not being able to enter an empty elevator. “Empty
elevator”, in common usage means an elevator which is empty
when seen from outside.

As for Smith, it is quite likely that had Russell written to Frege
about Smith, Frege might not have been particularly concerned.
He might just have advised Smith to convert to a more practical
religion.

Let us now return to Kripke’s problem. Let us assume that at each
moment of time, Kripke is mentally uttering a word or phrase to
himself. Perhaps the phrase is, “the set of all times when TV was
unknown.” Let p be the phrase and TVU be that set. The meaning
M(p) of p is TVU and by thinking p, Kripke can think of TVU.
Very possibly Kripke does not know exactly when TV became
known (known to how many?) but (as I have argued) he can think
of the set TVU just by mentally uttering the phrase p.

The meaning function M such that M(p) = TVU is determined by
society, i.e., by people including Kripke, but many many others as
well, and certain facts about television.

The meaning function M such that M(p) = TVU is determined by
society, i.e., by people including Kripke, but many many others as
well, and certain facts about television.
But now what happens if Kripke utters “S0 ” to himself at time
t0 ? What set is he thinking of? The answer to that is presumably,
M(S0 ). We have the expression “S0 ” and all we need now is the
function M. We can then look to see if t0 ∈ M(S0 ).

The trouble is that if at time t0 Kripke had not thought “S0 ” but
thought p instead, then t0 would have been in the value M(S0 ).
For M(p) as a set of times would have been empty. But Kripke
unwisely did not think p. Instead, he thought “S0 ” and by thinking
“S0 ” he put t0 out of M(S0 ). But no, by putting t0 out, he put it
back in, etc. etc.

The trouble is that if at time t0 Kripke had not thought “S0 ” but
thought p instead, then t0 would have been in the value M(S0 ).
For M(p) as a set of times would have been empty. But Kripke
unwisely did not think p. Instead, he thought “S0 ” and by thinking
“S0 ” he put t0 out of M(S0 ). But no, by putting t0 out, he put it
back in, etc. etc.
The fact that Kripke is thinking “S0 ” is not the problem. The
problem lies in the fact that Kripke is interfering with the meaning
function M by thinking “S0 ”.

In particular, if Kripke is uttering “S0 ” to himself at time t0 , does
M(S0 ) have the property of containing t0 ? Clearly the rest of us
cannot help Kripke here. He will have to make up his own mind
about M, just as Mr. Smith had to make up his mind whether to
go home or pay someone to move from room A to room B, or
perhaps convert to some other religion. Or he could go to a room
with an even number of people in it, knowing that the number
would be odd when he went in.

In sum, are Kripke’s troubles any worse than Smith’s? I am not
convinced that they are. Let me now present a baby result which
generalizes Kripke’s examples of TV and interplanetary travel. In
both cases, Kripke was able to make use of society’s denotation of
certain phrases by leaving the meaning function alone.

Let M be a function which takes a moment t of time and a phrase
p to produce a set. M may not depend on t at all. For example
M(p,t) where p is “the set of all times when TV was unknown”
does not depend on t at all – it is not indexical.

Let M be a function which takes a moment t of time and a phrase
p to produce a set. M may not depend on t at all. For example
M(p,t) where p is “the set of all times when TV was unknown”
does not depend on t at all – it is not indexical.
But we will allow indexicality. Thus if Humpty Dumpty says, “from
now on ‘horse’ means a cow” and we allow him this indulgence,
then after Humpty Dumpty’s remark, we can think of the set of
cows just by using the word “horse”. So we allow M to depend on
certain data, like Humpty Dumpty’s remark about the word
“horse”. If Kripke uses the function M to think of some set, he can
use his own behavior prior to the moment of his use of some
phrase p.

So let M be such a meaning function M(p,t,d) where p is a noun
phrase, t is a time, and d are some data about the world (but only
prior to times before t) and the thoughts of everyone including
Kripke prior to time t. If two sets of data d and d’ agree on all sets
of times up to but not including t, then M(p,t,d) and M(p,t,d’) are
required to be the same.

Definition: Suppose that at time t, some agent a is thinking some
expression p, and the meaning function of a’s community at time t
is M(t, . ) then agent a is said to be thinking of the object M(t,p).

I am ignoring issues where what the agent intends to think of is
not denoted by the expression that the agent is actually using. For
instance suppose Paul says to Shamasundar, “How is the weather
in Madras these days?”

I am ignoring issues where what the agent intends to think of is
not denoted by the expression that the agent is actually using. For
instance suppose Paul says to Shamasundar, “How is the weather
in Madras these days?”
Then Shyamansundar might respond, “There is no such place as
Madras. You are probably thinking of Chennai. The weather in
Chennai is fine”. Here we would say that in using the expression
“Madras” Paul is actually thinking of Chennai. I will ignore this
problem since it is not germane to Kripke’s worries in [Kp]. That
issue is, however, addressed by Kripke under speaker meaning [Ks].
See also [D].

Suppose now that Kripke decides to think “S0 ” at time t0 . That
fact is not part of the data at time t. So M(S0 , t0 , d) is already
determined and either contains t0 or does not. What Kripke thinks
at time t0 is not part of the data, and does not affect M, but he
certainly is free to use an already existing M to think whatever he
likes.

Suppose now that Kripke decides to think “S0 ” at time t0 . That
fact is not part of the data at time t. So M(S0 , t0 , d) is already
determined and either contains t0 or does not. What Kripke thinks
at time t0 is not part of the data, and does not affect M, but he
certainly is free to use an already existing M to think whatever he
likes.
That Kripke is thinking “S0 ” is certainly allowed to be an
argument to M, but is not allowed to interfere with M itself. What
if we want M to be able to depend on physical facts like the sun
turning into a giant red star, after time t? We can accomodate
such a need by making M depend on two kinds of data, linguistic
data dl up to but not including time t, and physical facts dp
including those from times after t.

The Santa Fe bar problem

There is a well known problem in game theory, the El Farol
problem due to Brian Arthur.

The Santa Fe bar problem

There is a well known problem in game theory, the El Farol
problem due to Brian Arthur.
The El Farol is a bar in Santa Fe, New Mexico which plays Irish
music on Thursdays and many people want to go. But they do not
want to go if the bar will be crowded. Let us say that the bar has a
capacity of 100, and 60 or more attending constitutes the bar
being crowded.

Suppose the entire community of possible bar goers has access to
the data about attendance on previous Thursdays and based on
this they form a theory T of whether the bar will be crowded on
this Thursday.

Then it is impossible for T to be correct.

Then it is impossible for T to be correct.
For if T predicts that the bar will be crowded then no one will go
and the bar will not be crowded.

Then it is impossible for T to be correct.
For if T predicts that the bar will be crowded then no one will go
and the bar will not be crowded.
If T predicts that the bar will not be crowded then everyone will
go and the bar will be crowded.

The isomorphism between the El Farol problem and Russell’s
paradox can easily be seen if we assume that only one person
wants to go and crowded is equivalent to not empty.

Conclusion: Can I enter an empty room? Yes, I can, provided that
I decide beforehand that “empty” means “empty before I enter.”

Groucho Marx’s Remark

I would not join any club which would have me as a
member!

The no trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey has a similar
flavor to Groucho’s remark.

One can think of other, more benign cases as well. For instance,
suppose Kripke thinks at a certain time t0 of the set T0 where T0
contains all times t at which he is thinking of a given set Tt of
times, and Tt does include t itself. Is t0 then a member of T0 ?
Here, instead of no solution, we have two consistent solutions,
rather like the situation with Henkin’s problem.

Henkin [H] asked if the formula of Peano Arithmetic which “says”,
“I am provable” is provable. The formula could be true and
provable or it could be false and unprovable. Unlike the Gödel
formula which said “I am not provable”, Henkin’s formula gives no
such trouble but leaves us with a choice. Löb [L] eventually gave a
positive answer, the Henkin formula is provable. But before Löb
did so, both answers, positive and negative, were plausible.
Kripke’s theory of truth [Kt] goes into similar issues in great depth,
but we shall simply stop here.
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